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On Sunday, December 16, 1990, in fair and peaceful elections held in ravaged
Haiti, the people made what appeared to be a decisive change for democratic rule
and social justice. Newly elected President Jean Bertrand Aristide was a shining
specter of hope for the Haitian people. His task to lead Haiti to some kind of
orderly democracy was onerous. While the new constitution had provided for
decentralized government, the enthusiastic vote for Aristide contrasted sharply
with the parliamentary races.
On September 30, 1991, a military coup ousted Aristide. Since then, the 6,000-
man Haitian army and police have carried out a campaign of terror and intimida-
tion against supporters of Aristide, who was popular with Haiti's poor people.1
In addition, since then, more than 16,000 refugees have fled the island, mostly
in response to the political chaos and economic turmoil.2 Those who escaped by
sea, however, were intercepted by the United States Coast Guard and held at
Guantanamo Naval Station.
On January 31, 1992, the United States Supreme Court cleared the way for the
Coast Guard to forcibly return about 10,000 Haitian boat people to their strife-torn
island nation.3 On February 4, 1992, cutters returned the first 381 Haitians.4
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1. Lee Hockstaden, Cutters Return First 381 of Fleeing Haitians, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1992,
at All.
2. As of March 19, 1992, an estimated 16,464 Haitians had been interdicted. See Haitian Centers
Council, Inv. v. McNary, 789 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
3. Baker v. Haitian Refugee Center, 112 S. Ct. 1073 (1992).
4. Hockstaden, supra note 1.
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Many of the returnees, who were denied political asylum in the United States,
were Aristide supporters and feared violence and prosecution.
In addition, a number of attempts to reinstate Aristide have been rejected. For
instance, on March 27, 1992, a Haiti Supreme Court rejected an agreement
brokered by the Organization of American States (OAS) seeking the return to
power of Aristide.5 The Supreme Court ruled that the agreement was unconstitu-
tional and could not be ratified by the Haitian parliament. 6 The ruling was a
setback to a February 23, 1992, agreement between Aristide and leaders of Haiti's
legislature that called for an end to international sanctions on Haiti if a new prime
minister was installed. 7 Further, the United States had partially lifted an embargo,
whose purpose was to cause economic hardship to those who orchestrated the
coup.
In considering the difficulties Haiti has faced, the question remains whether
Aristide's Lavalas (cleansing torrent) movement could have led the country to
some kind of orderly democracy. What is clear, however, is that strict conserva-
tive measures must be employed to bring this impoverished nation to economic
freedom. In doing so Haiti must put into place a strong rule of law, which in any
civilized nation is based on the premise that the rule is accessible, fair, and
predictable to produce economic and political stability. While the populace is
hungry for some sign of positive change, the desire for a "quick fix" will halt
any significant gains. In addition, the introduction of long-term solutions may
also prove disastrous. Moreover, prior bilateral trade agreements, such as the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), continue to offer very little positive economic
advancement for this island nation.
The overthrow of Aristide presents another interesting dilemma in the tumultu-
ous history of Haiti. The conflict arising in the reluctance of the army and the
upper class to recognize the needs of the majority poor continues to impact upon
Haitian progress. While President Aristide was the first president to be selected
in a free democratic election, the powers that have always controlled Haiti are
still entrenched. The strength of the Duvalier army still exists and possibly has
now forged an alliance with the bourgeoisie. The cost of democracy and freedom
is perhaps too great a price for the Haitian people to pay.
This article focuses on the historical impact of Haiti's past, the democratic rule
of law, Haitian political policy, and an examination of the CBI and its effect on
the Caribbean in general, and the Haitian nation in particular. Additionally, some
suggestions are offered for a new island order.
5. J.P. Slavin, Court Rejects Pact for Aristide's Return, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1992, at A16.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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I. The Significance of Rules
An autonomous individual is one who is rational and free with respect to
his own conduct. Rationality and freedom, when taken together, confer moral
responsibility for one's behavior. Thus, as described by Kant, autonomous indi-
viduals are self-legislating beings who act in accordance to laws derived from
their own reason. The newly freed Haitian slave in 1804 lacked this requisite, a
lacuna exacerbated by the absence of a governmental model. Slavery was replaced
by bewilderment and self-promotion. Further, in analyzing the political climate
of the time, government was by force and fear. Thus the slave mentality persisted,
and the individual continued to be one who was not self-legislated.8 In addition,
the body politic had no mutual consent between men to maintain a government.
From 1804 to the present, Haiti has been a country governed by men who have
enacted and enforced their own laws as they saw fit. Government, in its purest
sense, is in fact the coercion through threat and force of the many by a few.9
The revolt of the slaves could be characterized as a "negative revolution";
even as it rejected the old, repressive order it failed to provide for a new order.
The continuation of revolutions and coups d'stat in Haitian history merely formed
a foundation for the eventual military dictatorship of Duvalier.l° Although the
overthrow of the dictatorship provided a perfect opportunity for change, it has
merely fostered fractionalization among the various political groups. Addition-
ally, the lack of a central figure, such as Castro in Cuba, immediately after the
overthrow of Duvalier left the country politically adrift. President Aristide is a
charismatic figure who was sorely needed in Haiti. He represented the majority
of Haitians who believed in both his political philosophy and in him as a leader.
Again, Haiti is in a similar predicament in 1992 as it was in 1804: it has removed
the master, but has failed to decide internally what will be the replacement. '
If a government is to be successful, it must have a moral basis for legal order.
Whenever this moral basis is lacking, and consequently justification is lacking, the
government is merely a group of people who rule by sheer force. If a government is
to be viable, "the governed" will assume that the legal order is justified because
8. RICHARD TAYLOR, FREEDOM, ANARCHY, AND THE LAW 48 (1973).
9. [It is interesting to note] how continental European police systems came to be so highly centralized and came to
be associated with the repressive violence of autocratic monarchial regimes. Their legitimacy was derived from
the traditional legitimacy of the sovereign . . . for economic success, that is to say prosperity, has been a
legitimizing ground for centuries and in many kinds of societies.
CARL FRIEDRICH, THE PATHOLOGY OF POLITICS 22 (1972).
10. See SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1968), cited in
FRIEDRICH, supra note 9.
11. For a discussion of elements necessary for a successful change in the political order, see
FRIEDRICH, supra note 9, at 55. Every political order is subject to change, and unless means are
provided for adaptation of the institutions and processes to change as occur in the social substructure,
such change will lead to violence, either sporadic, as in much resistance, or all-engulfing, as in
political revolution.
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the laws and the judicial apparatus that manage them contain certain general
principles of morality such as respect for human life, the rights of the individual,
the sanctity of property, and fairness. The quality of the legal order turns on
governmental protection, which promotes and upholds justice and morality. 2 The
political power comes from the people and legitimizes the government. Based on
Rousseau's theory of social contract, popular consent is given by the people
to the government. Rousseau believed that at one time people lived without
government and were governed by natural law in the natural state. 13
The question, then, is what has prevented the Haitian republic from developing
into a modern nation? The problem is twofold. First, Haitians generally mistrust
the people in the government since historically a strong central government that
can provide both safety and a finite safeguard of the rule of law has been nonexis-
tent. Second, the attempt to establish a democracy in a country that is 90 percent
illiterate is an extraordinary feat. The time has come to reevaluate the governmen-
tal and ideological concept called democracy, vis-A-vis a third-world country such
as Haiti. Can an underdeveloped country newly freed from dictatorial rule, which
views traditional democracy through media exposure, expect to attain such a goal
so quickly without pain? The answer is obvious. Unfortunately, however, the
major thrust in U.S. foreign policy is to ensure democracy at any and all cost.
Haitians, through the media, know how others live and expect that democracy
will be the magic wand that will immediately provide them the typical standards
of living enjoyed by other democratically ruled countries. The result is a revolu-
tion of the rising expectations syndrome; the expectations escalate at a faster rate
than the institution can handle, and instability again results. In order for a country
to wipe away decades of inactivity, corruption, illiteracy, health-care problems,
and housing shortages, it must assemble democracy in stages. New services,
infrastructure, and institutions must be overhauled and recreated to achieve this
goal. Simply holding elections will not suffice. If a country is to achieve long-
12. The notions of justice and morality have been the subject of philosophers throughout the ages.
Plato thought that the right to rule coincides with the degree of philosophical acumen necessary fqr
the understanding of justice. Locke and others of his era posited that men have certain natural rights
which government must respect and protect. See also THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIC, THE
BASIC WRITINGS OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS (1945); RAY C. MACRIDIS, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
IDEOLOGIES (1986).
13. LEON P. BARADAT, POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES-THEIR ORIGINS AND IMPACT 47 (1988). While
Hobbs, Locke, and Rousseau agreed on many points, they also differed on many others. They agreed
that the individual should be free, but they disagreed on the definition of freedom.
The conservative Hobbs made a significant contribution to the development of democracy by supporting the notion
that political power comes from the people and by insisting on the separation of church and state. Even so, he
believed that the evil nature of people made them prisoners of their own greed .... The liberal Locke, on the other
hand, thought that because people were basically good, freedom was greatest when the individual was left alone.
The radical Rousseau believed that people were timid and peaceful in the state of nature. They became greedy only
after they entered a society that had become perverted by private property. Freedom from the captivity of their
own passion could be achieved only through the creation of a new society where equality was the dominant principle.
* . . While Hobbs held that the monarch was this authority, Rousseau asked individuals to surrender themselves
to the community, or general will.
Id.
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lasting peace and prosperity, it must first reestablish the rule of law, and the
governed must legitimize the government. It must also give assurances that order
and protection will uphold the rights of the individual. Then, and only then, will
the atmosphere permit the first step towards the establishment of a democracy.
At this point a call should also go out to those of the Haitian diaspora to return
home to provide managerial, educational, medical, and business expertise to get
the country moving again. This return can only be achieved if those emigr6s feel
that their safety will be assured.
H. Haitian Political Policy
Haiti presents a special case in the historical evolution of the Caribbean because
it was the first country to successfully revolt against the white plantocracy. The
newly emancipated slaves had only two models for governance: the plantation
and the tribe. The new leadership imposed no new social order. In essence, the
Haitian people rebelled against slavery and replaced it with nothing. Moreover,
external help was not forthcoming from Europe or from the emerging American
republic that maintained slavery within its borders. Thus, Haiti bobbed and
weaved through history with corrupt leadership and a serious internal color caste
problem, which plagues it to this day.
The United States became interested in Haiti in the late nineteenth century due
to its paranoia with European expansion into the Caribbean and South America.
United States chauvinism reached its peak with the occupation of Haiti, and
later the fear of communism brought with it support to any dictator who cried
"communist insurgency" regardless of the cost to its citizenry. Frangois Duvalier
was a master at crying the "communist wolf" to the United States whenever it
was practical and when his coffers were running low. Duvalier's experience
during the U.S. occupation shaped the noiriste philosophy that, had it been pre-
sented in a positive fashion, could have brought the country to a new philosophical
level. Instead, this ideal caused havoc, exiled the educated class, and consumed
the country in an atmosphere of fear and chaos. Duvalier's policies, and the
U.S. support of them, further catapulted the country into economic, political,
educational, and social decline. Frangois Duvalier's death in 1971 was not a
reprieve from corruption, but a continuation of it in the form of his heir to the
presidential chair-Jean Claude. Although the violence was somewhat subdued,
the family's wholesale and blatant theft of the government's coffers continued.
The exile of Jean Claude Duvalier and his family in 1986 was to be the final
chapter in dictatorial politics and a new beginning for the ravaged country. How-
ever, Haitian blood continues to be shed, and political unrest is the only constant.
Since the exit of Jean Claude, Haiti has had six presidents: General Namphy,
President Manigat, General Avril, Ertha Pascal Trouillot (who accepted the posi-
tion after three other men turned it down), Bertrand Aristide, and Judge Joseph
Nerette, who was installed shortly after the coup. Perhaps by expecting a country
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to go from a dictatorship to a democracy in one step is asking too much. We have
seen time and time again that the U.S. version of democracy when employed in
the third-world environment simply does not work. A new definition of democracy
must be found for countries such as Haiti where chaos, greed, and fear have been
the rule of law. This author suggests the following steps:
(a) Dispatch a United Nations peacekeeping team to Haiti.
(b) Eliminate all weapons on the island for a period of years.
(c) Rule by a coalition of people representing the various factions.
(d) Pass emergency legislation that would permit foreign contracts to develop
infrastructure projects and build factories for economic development proj-
ects. In exchange the government would provide tax incentives where
project developers provide school and housing for workers and their fami-
lies. A "company town" concept should be implemented whereby all the
company towns' developers would form a coalition and would provide
stability and uniformity for the people.
(e) Implement a plan whereby after ten years a general election could be held
for a president and a legislature. By then the country should be economically
stable, the population more educated and employed, and the new generation
would have had ten years of peace and prosperity. This government would
usher in the next phase of democracy, which would replace the U.N.
peacekeeping forces, who would have assisted with the development of a
new army and the democratic election of a new president. The political
coalition would then be phased out.
Haiti is at a crossroads in its development; if the next step is not taken to do
something constructive to move it into the twentieth century, it may never happen.
The United States cannot dictate, but can cajole.14 The "American Plan," the
buzzword in Haiti, now has two strategies for development: one, the displacement
of the rural population to work in U.S. industries in the urban areas; and two,
a restructured agriculture that is owned by U.S. nationals. However noble, the
intent to provide more low-paying jobs for the masses misses the mark. 15 While
Haitians need jobs, they also need education, better health care, and decent shelter.
14. For an example of U.S. mismanagement in Haiti, see AMY WILENTZ, THE RAINY SEASON
271-72 (1989):
In 1941, the United States and Haiti began a cooperative venture called the Socidtd Hiiiano-Amdricaine de Ddvelopp-
ment Agricole (SHADA), the Haitian-American Company for Agricultural Development, a prototypical aid project
run by Americans who ignored the protests of responsible Haitian experts. Financed by an Export-Import Bank
loan of $5 million and later the recipient of another $7 million in U.S. credit, SHADA proposed to raise sisal and
rubber .... SHADA was a bold project, and the Haitian government, also ignoring the indigenous experts, did
everything it could to help implement the plans of the American agronomist who had developed the idea .... In
the end. according to the summary in Written in Blood and in other reports of the SHADA debacle, some forty
thousand families were kicked off their property, although the project never cultivated even half of that land. For
four years, SHADA had managed more than 5 percent of Haiti's finest agricultural lands, yet when the project
was over, only five tons of rubber-a scandalously low return-had been harvested.
15. DeWind and Kunley point out in its 1982 Country Development Strategy Statement, USAID "anticipates that such
a drastic reorientation of agriculture will cause a decline in income and nutritional status, especially for small
farmers and peasants .... Even if transition to export agriculture is successful, AID anticipates a 'massive'
displacement of peasant farmers and migration to urban centers."
Id. at 282.
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A 1985 World Bank Report entitled "Haiti: Policy Proposals for Growth"
advised "the Haitian government-and, by extension, foreign-aid donors-to cut
back on social and health programs and use the monies thus saved to build up
infrastructure.- 16 In a chapter called "The Way Forward," the World Bank
suggested that "capital expenditure not essential to increasing output . . . should
be reduced and should be stabilized in the case of health and the social components
within rural development projects.""
Clearly, cultural and political traditions stand in the way of progress and mod-
emization in Haiti. The association of democracy with capitalism is not generally
accepted in Haiti as the solution to its problems.1 8 The deprivation and humiliation
of slavery by the French, the occupation by the Americans, the dictatorship of
the Duvaliers, and the continuation of the tonton macoutes have left Haiti in
continuous chaos and turmoil.*9
Although the U.S. plan stresses the need for social objectives to be related to
economic growth, the larger question becomes, at whose expense? The purpose
of the CBI was allegedly to encourage private enterprise investment by U.S.
citizens in exchange for economic and military dominance in the region. Upon
evaluation of the CBI, however, the entire Caribbean is no better off than it was
before the enactment. The following section examines CBI, its impact overall,
and its effect on Haiti in particular.
III. The Caribbean Basin Initiative
In a message to Congress on March 17, 1982, former President Reagan submit-
ted a proposal entitled the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). In August 1983 the
16. Id. at 274.
17. Id. The report goes on to state, "temporarily, less emphasis should be placed on social
objectives which increase consumption, since the urgent need is to free a major share of GDP [gross
domestic product] growth for export." Id. On the subject of education, the report states: "Education
... is essential to long-term development. In the short term, however, it is a cost. This cost is
necessary but should be minimized .... Thus, social objectives should be more strictly related to
economic growth ... and private sector participation in the achievement of social objectives should
be pursued where possible." Id. This represents the classic trickle-down theory that simply does not
work in the United States and certainly not in Haiti.
18. Id. at 275-76. A conversation with former President Aristide, a staunch anti-Duvalierist,
revealed the following:
You want to make sure it [an investment) gives you the best rate of return: stability and profit, in the case of
the U.S. in Haiti. This is normal, capitalist behavior, and I don't care if the U.S. wants to do it at horm. You can
do whatever you want in your own home, right? But it is monstrous to come down here and impose your will on
another people. Why should we advance the way you want us to advance? I understand the reality of the geographical
situation, and the geopolitical situation, but I cannot accept that Haiti should be whatever the United States wants
it to be.... but one thing Haitians have made clear, from Dessalines to Duvalier, good and bad alike, is that we
do not bow to the will of other nations. We may pretend to, but we don't, We've never been a client state.
Id.
19. Neil A. Lewis, W9hat Can the U.S. Really Do About Haiti? N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 6, 1987, sec.
4, at 2 ("What the United States said it wanted for the impoverished and largely illiterate population
of that country was the first free election in 30 years. When the balloting was canceled by attacks
on polling places. . . . there was a rush to debate what went wrong and whether the American ability
to influence events in the region had been reduced. But a larger question that was underlined in Haiti
is how far the United States can go in manipulating the affairs of other countries").
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proposal was enacted into law as the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act
(CBERA). 20 The purposes of the CBERA are twofold: to encourage private enter-
prise from the United States by providing an atmosphere of investment safety for
U.S. investors; and to enhance and preserve the military and economic dominance
of the United States in the Caribbean region. President Reagan indicated in a
speech to the Organization of American States (OAS) that the program would
"integrate trade, aid, and investment" 2 ' and would serve as the basis of U.S.
economic support to the political and economic problems of the region by estab-
lishing a long-term commitment to the beneficiary countries.
A close scrutiny of the CBERA, and an analysis of the past nine years of its
existence, however, leave one asking whether the CBI beneficiary countries are
any better off now then they were in 1983. The answer is a resounding "no."
In reality the CBERA is nothing more than an attempt to provide safe legal
environments for corporations to thrive in cheap labor societies. It has not and
will not lead to the development of stable economies. Rather, it will result in
continuation of increased debt and inequality between rich and poor nations.22
CBI has been criticized as being "presented mainly as a means to counter Cuba,
not primarily as a way to respond directly to the needs of the people of the
Caribbean.' '23 By the time Congress approved CBI the "United States preoccupa-
tions had shifted from the Caribbean to Central America, and from assistance to
the private sector to military and economic support to friendly governments in
Central America. " 24
IV. Beneficiary Status vs. Sovereignty
The seeds of CBI were sown by Edward Seaga in October 197925 in a speech
that illuminated the need for a mini-Marshall Plan and a Puerto Rico-style special
20. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384 (1983) (codified
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Recovery Act]. A country listed by law as eligible
for the program must also be designated by the President as a beneficiary on the basis of a set of
criteria and conditions. At present, twenty-three countries are so designated: Antiqua and Barbuda,
Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, St. Christopher
and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and the British Virgin
Islands.
21. 18 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 217-23 (Mar. 1, 1982) [hereinafter OAS Speech].
22. CBI was criticized in the foreign affairs community as ill-concerned. See Caribbean Basin
Initiative-1983: Hearing on Section 544 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 1 st Sess.
140, 169 (1983) (statement of Joseph Pilgman) [hereinafter Hearings]. See also Sidney Weintraub,
A Flawed Model, 47 FOREIGN POLICY 128 (1982); Richard E. Feinberg & Richard S. Newfarmer,
A Bilateral Gamble, 47 FOREIGN POLICY 133 (1982).
23. Hearings, supra note 22, at 170 (statement of Abraham F. Lowenthal).
24. Kari Polanyi-Levitt, The Origins and Implications of the Caribbean Basin Initiative; Mortgag-
ing Sovereignty? 1985 INT'L J. 229, 234.
25. Speechby Edward Seaga to Diplomatic Corps, Oct. 10, 1979, in SUNDAY GLEANER (Jamaica).
Seaga became prime minister of Jamaica in 1980.
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relationship between the United States and the Caribbean. Other proposals for a
special trade and aid relationship were discussed during the Carter administra-
tion.26 Later, when Reagan became president, the focus of the proposed relation-
ship shifted from the Carter global and multilateral approach to gunboat econom-
ics.27 Further, the disproportionate amount allocated to El Salvador and Costa
Rica prompted critics to say that CBI was a means to further U.S. interests in
Central America. 2s The Reagan administration continued to assert that the pro-
gram would "help establish the conditions under which a free and competitive
private sector could flourish." 29 However, upon closer scrutiny, the private sector
is located in the United States, not in the Caribbean.
In the initial proposal, investors would receive investment tax credits. In order
to participate, the countries would be forced to change their investment policies
to attract foreign investment. The CBERA encompasses not only the countries
of the Caribbean, but also expands into Latin America. The country seeking
beneficiary status must assure the administration that the beneficiary is prepared
to provide a virtually risk-free environment for U.S. business interests.3 ° A coun-
try can fall from grace if it "has taken steps to repudiate or nullify a contract"
or "has imposed or enforced taxes or other exactions, restrictive maintenance or
operational conditions, or other measures."31 Thus, if the effect of the aforemen-
tioned activities is to nationalize, expropriate, or otherwise seize ownership or
control of U.S. property," 32 the country will lose its beneficiary status. In effect,
a country mortgages its sovereignty to participate in the program. 33 Third-world
countries contend that sovereignty of a nation over its resources is a basic rule
of international law so long as it is for a public purpose and is nondiscriminatory.
This position has been adopted by the United Nations and has gained support with
a growing number of states to be considered a generally accepted principle of
26. See Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. Security & Latin America, COMMENTARY, Jan. 1981, at 29;
Robert Pastor, U.S. Security & Latin America, COMMENTARY, Apr. 1981, at 4.
27. Jeffrey E. Garten, Gunboat Economics, 64 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 538-59 (1985).
28. Supplemental Appropriation for FY 1982, $350 million of which $128 million was earmarked
for El Salvador, $70 million for Costa Rica. See Richard E. Feinberg, et al., The Battle over the CBI.
The Debate in Washington, 12 CARIBBEAN REV. 12, 15-18 (1983).
The CBI investment incentive provisions had the roughest treatment of all in Congress and were eventually
dropped. Instead, businesses holding conventions in CBI countries were to be given tax deductions. To qualify for
the convention concession, however, a country had to sign an agreement with the United States Treasury undertaking
to disclose tax information. While this incentive might provide some stimulus to investment in the tourist sector,
the condition appears to be aimed at the Bahamas and other Caribbean territories which specialize in offshore
financial services and related tax haven activity.
Id.
29. Id.
30. If a country has "nationalized, expropriated or otherwise seized ownership or control of
property owned by a United States citizen or by a corporation, partnership or association which is
50 percentum or more beneficially owned by United States citizens," the President is prohibited from
conferring beneficiary status. Recovery Act, supra note 20, § 2702(b)(2)(A).
31. Id. § 2702(b)(2)(C).
32. Id.
33. A country can be "redeemed" if it pays "prompt, adequate and effective compensation" to
aggrieved investors. Id. § 102(b)(2)(D).
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international law. 34 Under CBERA, a country also will be denied beneficiary
status if it fails to provide an economic and political environment to foster private
enterprise.3" Again, to receive the beneficiary status a country must be prepared
to subordinate its sovereign rights.
The investment tax credit provision was subsequently replaced with an allow-
able deduction for reasonable business expenses for a tax resident of the United
States who attends a convention in an eligible beneficiary country. In return,
that country must agree to exchange information to enforce tax laws and not
discriminate against U.S. convention sites in its tax law.36
In essence, beneficiary status achieves three goals: first, countries that partici-
pate in the program become increasingly economically dependent on the United
States; second, it rewards and coerces countries to support U.S. policies even if
in conflict with the countries' internal laws; and third, it isolates countries that are
considered a threat to United States security from participation and the resulting
economic benefits.
V. Duty-Free Trade-Economic Assistance
The centerpiece of CBI is the provision for duty-free trade for Caribbean Basin
products exported to the United States. Since 87 percent of exports from that
region entered the United States duty free before CBI, then another question
arises: What is there to be gained by the CBERA?38 Certain articles deemed
"import sensitive" are excluded from duty-free importation. These articles in-
clude: (1) textiles and apparel subject to textile agreements; (2) footwear, hand-
bags, luggage, flat goods, work gloves, and leather apparel ineligible for duty-free
status under the generalized system of preference (GSP); (3) canned tuna; (4)
petroleum and its products; and (5) watches and watch parts containing any
material originating in countries whose products are subject to nonconcessionary
(full) duty rates (most communist countries). An import qualifies for duty-free
34. There are several fundamental problems between the American view and the Caribbean view.
First, the concept of a nation's sovereignty to control its resources is an important issue. The United
States contends it is unnecessary for the host country to expropriate, impose taxes, or nullify its
agreement with a United States corporation. It is quite interesting that the host government is precluded
from taxation whereas the American government remains clearly interested in taxing its nationals.
Also, if there is a dispute, the host country tribunals should be prepared to side with the American
corporation and repayment should be in convertible currency rather than in local currency. Again,
this is an extra added burden for the host country and clearly outside the scope of internationally
accepted methods of repayment in the event of expropriation. Id. § 2702(b)(3).
35. Id. § 2702(b)(1) (a Communist country is prohibited from participation).
36. Id. §§ 221-223, 27 U.S.C. § 274(h)(6).
37. Administration officials have stated that the Act's anticommunism provision applies only to
Cuba; initially Grenada and Nicaragua were to be excluded as well but as of this writing Grenada
is a beneficiary country. See Hearings, supra note 22, at 68 (statement of Stoessel), 72 (statement
of Brock).
38. The Caribbean Basin Policy Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of
the House Commission on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1 st Sess. 170 (statement of Stephen L. Lande).
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status if it is made in the CBERA country of exportation and at least 35 percent
of its value has originated in that or any other CBERA country (including also
value originated in Puerto Rico or the U.S. Virgin Islands), but up to 15 percent
of the 35 percent of its value also may have originated in the United States.39
Special rules also apply to sugar and beef products. Since sugar is the most
important export of the majority of Caribbean countries, these restrictions (largely
from the sugar lobby in Washington) deprive the sugar producers of a competitive
edge in the U.S. market.40 Thus, the CBERA is another ploy to induce countries
to adopt economic policies that are consistent with U.S. interests and usually
inconsistent with their own laws. The gains made by CBERA countries in the area
of tariff savings have been negligible (see Appendix).
A proposed component of the CBI was "large and immediate infusions of
foreign exchange for balance of payments support." 4 This goal was never accom-
plished because the administration failed to provide an adequate appropriation,
and the region's foreign exchange shortfall for 1982 was roughly four billion
dollars.42 Thus, the decision was made to funnel the foreign exchange assistance
funds "primarily to finance private-sector imports." 43 Therefore, the net result
39. Vladimir N. Pregely, CRS Issue Brief, Expanding the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery
Act (Libr. of Cong. CBI II) Apr. 25, 1990 (Cong. Res. Service, Econ. Div.) [hereinafter CRS Issue
Bnef].
40. Id. at 3:
Duty-free treatment of these products is contingent on the beneficiary countries submitting a stable food production
plan ensuring that the food production and nutritional level of the country will not be adversely affected by increases
in the production of sugar and beef products for export in response to CBERA tariff benefits. Under this provision
sugar and beef products of Antiqua and Barbados, Montserrat. Netherlands Antilles, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and
the Grenadines are not eligible for CBERA duty-free treatment.
Restrictions also are placed on duty-free treatment of sugars, syrups, and molasses when measures
to protect the price-support program for sugar beets and sugar cane are in effect in the United States.
In such a situation, sugar products from most CBERA countries are subject to the same "competitive
need" formula that applies under the GSP, whereby the duty-free status of a product imported from
a beneficiary country is suspended if the imports of that product from that country exceed certain
absolute or relative ceilings. Alternatively, a CBERA country may request that instead of the suspen-
sion of their duty-free status, its exports of sugar products to the United States remain duty free but
subject to import quotas. This choice does not apply to three Caribbean countries (Dominican Republic,
Guatemala, and Panama) whose exports of sugar products to the United States were not eligible in
1981 for duty-free status under the GSP because of having already exceeded the "competitive need"
limits; imports of their sugar are subject to absolute, but duty-free annual quotas under the CBERA,
unless lower ceilings are imposed under some other law. Id.
41. Statement of AID Administrator M. Peter McPherson on the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 5
AGENDA 4 (1982).
42. Caribbean Basin Initiative: Hearings on S. 2237 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 220 (1982) (statement of Richard E. Feinberg and Richard S. Newfarmer).
43. The Economic Support Fund (ESF) is administered by the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development (AID). The "[ESF] provides loans and grants to selected countries of special
political and security interest to the United States . . . in turn the recipients purchase goods and
services from the U.S. institutions and firms." U.S. Agency for International Development, Facts
About AID, 5 AGENDA (inside front cover) (1982).
Also created under the aegis of AID is the Bureau for Private Enterprise. The Bureau will "provide
technical assistance to the host country governments, providing policy guidance, and where required
and requested, recommending changes to improve the investment 'climate' of the host country .
McPherson, supra note 41, at 4.
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has been and continues to be increased dependence upon imports, which further
frustrates the foreign exchange problems the CBERA seeks to cure.
President Bush, a day before the Houston economic summit in July 1990,
offered an olive branch to Latin American and Caribbean nations. The package
had three key elements: "a free-trade zone, reduction or cancellation of $12
billion in U.S. government loans to the region, and a new effort to stimulate
foreign investment."" Assessing the impact this initiative will have on the eco-
nomic health of the region and its relationship to CBERA would be premature.
Suffice it to say that the olive branch will have a price.
VI. CBI H-The Future
Congress is considering a substantive revision of the original CBI (H.R. 1233,
H.R. 1594 and S. 504). "Both [House] bills in their current versions omit the
original provision of CBI I (still present in S. 504) allowing duty-free quotas for
nontextile, import-sensitive articles." 45 The common points of both bills follow.
(1) CBERA is permanent. 46
(2) In order for a country to qualify for beneficiary status it must recognize
international worker rights for its workers. Presidential review of workers'
rights in CBERA countries is also required.47
(3) Commencing October 1, 1992, and every three years thereafter, the Presi-
dent is required to submit a report on the operation of CBERA to Con-
gress.
4
(4) English-speaking countries will receive special consideration regarding
CBERA benefits.49
(5) Duty-free allowance will be granted for U.S. residents returning from
CBERA countries. The $600 allowance will increase from $400. One
additional liter of alcoholic beverages will be duty- and excise-free if the
product is produced by a CBERA country. Returnees from U.S. posses-
sions are allowed to bring $1,200 into the United States. 50
(6) Articles (excluding textiles and apparel) assembled or processed in a
CBERA country entirely from U.S.-made components or ingredients will
receive duty-free and quota-free treatment.5
(7) The Secretary of Commerce is required to complete a study regarding
tourism development for the Caribbean.52
44. Hobart Rowen, Giving Latin Economics a Lift, WASH. POST, July 8, 1990, at HI, H3.
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(8) A U.S. preclearance customs pilot program will test the assistance of such
operations in the development of tourism. This program is contingent on
a bilateral agreement for the protection of U.S. personnel and of U.S.
immigration preinspection operations. 3
H.R. 1233 contains the following additional provisions (not included in H.R.
1594).
(1) Preferential duty treatment is included for certain import-sensitive articles
ineligible for it by law. Duty-free treatment extends to the full value of
textile articles assembled in a CBERA country from U.S., or specifically
named foreign-made, cut fabric and imported under bilateral guaranteed-
access level (GAL) agreement. It can contain foreign trimmings and bind-
ings up to 25 percent of import value. Under a separate preference, any
textile or apparel article imported from a CBI country under a regular
bilateral quota (not GAL) agreement would be dutied at a rate equal to the
lower of either 50 percent of the trade-weighted average duty rate or its
concessional rate.
(2) Sugar's quota allocation is 371,449 metric tons (the actual 1988 allocation).
The provision also allows for the reallocation of any unutilized country
quota allocations or "those suspended or terminated under a law authoriz-
ing such action for the purposes of dealing with a threat to the national
security or foreign policy of the United States."-6
(3) The President has authority to proclaim new rules of origin for imports
from CBERA countries, subject to consultations, a report to Congress, and
a ninety-day waiting period for additional consultations with congressional
committees .
7
(4) A special provision concerns antidumping and countervailing investiga-
tions regarding imported goods from CBERA countries.58
(5) The Agency for International Development (AID) establishes a program
for scholarship assistance for students from CBERA countries.5
(6) The Secretary of Agriculture in coordination with AID should develop
programs to encourage improvements in transportation and cargo handling
facilities in CBERA countries and duty-free reimportation of Puerto Rican
products processed in a CB1 country without being substantially trans-
formed. However, the materials added must be of U.S. or CBERA country
origin. 60
53. Id.
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The initiation of trade agreements rarely yields equality for all parties con-
cerned, and CBERA is no different. However, for progress to continue, the
agreement should provide true economic advantages for the beneficiary nation as
well as the United States. If the countries involved are to continue to participate,
the United States must present a more balanced program. If the financial interests
of U.S. investors are to be protected by requesting a nation to change its taxing
or expropriation authority and support U.S. military and political interests, the
economic carrot must be worthwhile. CBERA presents a flawed economic con-
struct, and the new CBI II does not contain significant improvements. The diver-
sity of the Caribbean makes it difficult to unify it into one compact package. The
CBERA fails to provide adequate aid and respect for a nation's sovereignty.
Furthermore, it will only exacerbate the immigrant problem.6 1
VII. CBI and Haiti
In the Executive Summary of the CBI by the General Accounting Office, 62 case
studies were performed in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Dominica, St. Vincent
(and the Grenadines), Grenada, and Belize. The study attempted to evaluate
the effectiveness of CBI in the areas of debt service problems, employment
opportunities, and overall economic growth. The legislative and policy considera-
tions of CBI, which accord preferential trade and investment treatment to the
participating Caribbean countries, were paramount in assessing the impact of
CBI.
Haiti is the poorest country in the Western hemisphere and has lacked economic
and political stability. Thus, one should not be alarmed when viewing the minimal
impact CBI has had on this country. Prior to CBI, the United States was the major
trading partner of Haiti; exports to the United States after the enactment of CRI
for the years 1983 to 1986 rose a mere .93 percent from 76.06 percent to 76.99
percent. 63 Undoubtedly economic development operates in tandem with democ-
racy in a safe environment. If Haiti is to prosper financially, it must develop a
plan to provide an atmosphere where foreign business can invest in a relative
comfort level in terms of governmental support and physical safety for foreign
nationals. The Eastern bloc countries provide additional stress on already scarce
U.S. foreign development monies and private business capital. They stand ready
to provide a supportive atmosphere conducive to foreign business.
61. Hearings, supra note 22, at 1. "The region forms the third border of the United States,
contains vital sea lanes through which three-quarters of our oil imports must flow, is an important
market for U.S. exports, and is our second largest source of illegal immigration." Special Report
No. 97, in Hearings, supra note 22. See John Dilin, Immigration Issues Land in Clinton's Lap,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 18, 1992, at 7 (economic need and political tyranny could prompt
hundreds of thousands of Haitians to attempt to reach Florida next year and that low wages and
joblessness in Mexico still force millions to migrate to California, Texas, and Sun Belt states).
62. GAO/NSIAD 88-177, CBI Impact 1988, at 1.
63. Id. at 14.
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The U.S. foreign policy toward the third world has always been criticized in
terms of exploitation of the indigenous population, which can certainly be a
criticism of CBI. However, third-world countries are in direct competition with
the newly emerging second world and must come to grips with the importance
of what impact that will have on their economic development. Why should busi-
nessmen invest in countries that are fragile politically? If countries like Haiti do
not come to an understanding of the fiscal realities that businesses must assess
before becoming involved in a venture, then Haiti will continue to be the poorest
republic in the Western hemisphere. Furthermore, the legislative policies of coun-
tries, such as the United States, serve to protect their nationals, and rightly
so. Thus, Haiti must politically, through some orderly mechanisms, carve out
financially lucrative deals that will benefit the country at large and those who
provide the investment capital. Haiti can no longer be a country politically con-
trolled by a few at the expense of the masses. President Aristide presented the
fresh opportunity in which Haiti had waited for so long. Possibly his successor,
through creative democratic management, can accomplish democratic and eco-
nomic development goals. Although CBI and other programs like it present a
flawed construct, they do offer a new beginning whereby Haiti and other countries
in the Caribbean can finally make some inroads that will later allow them to gain
greater control over their destinies. An opportunity is better then none at all.
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APPENDIX
U.S. Imports from CBERA Countries, 1983-1988;
by Type of Tariff Treatment



































































































































Due to rounding, detail may not add to total.
* Less than $500,000. - Nil.
'Excludes dutiable portion of TSUS 806/807 imports.
2Includes dutiable portion of TSUS 806/807 imports.3Includes total (duty-free and dutiable) value of 807 imports.
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission, Annual Report on the Impact of the Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act on U.S. Industries and Consumers: Third Report, 1987, USITC Publication
2122, Sept. 1988, 1-8, 1-11; Fourth Report, 1988, USITC Publication 2225, Sept. 1989, 1-8, 1-
13. Computations by CRS. 64
64. CRS Issue Brief, supra note 39, at 6.
